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     By 
  Mike Parsons and Mary B. Rose (Lancaster University, UK) 
 
Region was crucial in Britain’s industrial revolution and by 1830, Lancashire south of 
the Ribble, had emerged as a highly sophisticated local economy including 
manufacturing, commerce, finance, transport, mining, machine making and machine 
tools.  Through the nineteenth century, sustained export market growth encouraged an 
unprecedented level of both vertical and, more especially, spatial specialisation 
and Lancashire evolved into Marshall’s classic industrial district. An industrial district 
can be defined as a concentrated agglomeration of interrelated firms, which are both 
economically and socially embedded in a region. Economies tend to be external to the 
firm and in Lancashire, yarn, cloth and market specialisms were underpinned by 
distinctive machine making in each town. In addition, Manchester’s commercial 
sector acted as a conduit for intermediate goods and services, while numerous 
shipping houses linked manufacturers with their diverse markets, though arguably 
separated them from their customers. 2  
Some industrial districts survive for centuries, evolving and changing through 
time. However, external changes, especially market and technological shifts, can 
undermine the buoyancy of an industrial district, as was the case in Lancashire. 3 The 
twentieth century decline of the Lancashire cotton industry remains one of the most  
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hotly debated topics in business and economic history, with much attention 
directed to the reasons for the limited strategic response to growing foreign 
competition. The very characteristics which brought competitive advantage to 
nineteenth century industrial Lancashire were seen as a principal cause of decline, 
while the loss of the buoyant Indian market made investment in innovation singularly 
unattractive. Changing circumstances undermined the creative, financial, social and 
economic basis of Lancashire as an industrial district, while external pressures 
encouraged short-lived and often ineffective cartelisation. By the 1970s and 1980s 
King Cotton was virtually dead, mills demolished and Lancashire’s industrial past 
increasingly either scrapped or consigned to the heritage industry. 4
Yet, there are legacies of Lancashire’s specialised structure, which have been 
neglected. This is because of concentration by researchers on explaining the collapse 
of coarse cotton spinning and weaving. 5 In addition, much attention has been given to 
the problems associated with the separation of manufacturers from their markets, that 
came with the numerous highly specialised shippers. Compared to the countless 
articles revolving around the rings and mules debate, there have been few analyses of 
the finishing trades and still fewer looking at firms at the top of the market.6 Equally, 
with attention heavily focused on yarn and cloth production, there has been little 
discussion of the consumer goods into which cotton cloth was made.  
 The collapse of Lancashire’s conventional markets had a devastating impact 
on spinning and weaving in the county. However, a segment of high performance 
fabrics and technical textiles survived and developed, related to newly emerging 
demands from the outdoor trade and industrial customers. This under researched 
element of Lancashire’s cotton legacy can be understood in the context of path 
dependency. As Paul David has observed: 
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‘ the influences of past events and of the states they bring must be 
communicated –like the deepening of the wheel ruts by each successive 
vehicle- through some definite chain of intervening casual events, effects and 
resultant states –down to the present state, whence they can be passed on to 
future events.’ 7
This does not mean that the relationship between past and future is linear.  Rather it 
means that the skills and knowledge embedded within a community impact upon the 
form that changes take. They also affect the choices made in a shifting economic and 
technological environment.  
This article focuses on the evolution of the skill and knowledge bases 
associated with rubberised rainwear, including chemicals and high performance 
fabrics and considers their impact upon a new consumer good sector after 1960. It 
shows that, while the innovation process in these new sectors was anything but linear 
or pre-determined,  it was undoubtedly shaped by Lancashire’s textile past. Through 
networking arrangements, underpinned by the social capital of entrepreneurs, the 
skills and ancillary sectors linked to these activities contributed to innovation in one 
of the UK’s more dynamic consumer goods sectors, from the 1960s to the 1990s. In a 
period of declining manufacturing and lack of international competitiveness, a 
number of companies manufacturing clothing and equipment for outdoor sports 
emerged as world leaders, enjoying international standing and growing levels of 
exports. Firms such as Peter Storm, Karrimor, Mountain Equipment, and much later 
Regatta and Rab, became household names, for rucksacks, sleeping bags and 
waterproof and windproof clothing. 8 This article explores the relationship between 
this new and emerging sector and the legacy of Lancashire’s declining industrial 
district. The article will be divided into three substantive sections. The first will 
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briefly survey the development of the Lancashire industrial district in the nineteenth 
century and its subsequent collapse, before examining the neglected legacies of 
rainwear and high performance fabric. It will track the evolution of Macintosh 
rainwear in the nineteenth century and trace the emergence of other high performance 
fabrics, including Burberry gabardine, Grenfell and Ventile. The second section will 
show the continued and evolving role of networks in the context of innovation in 
Lancashire. This is less in the context of cluster evolution as from the perspective of 
the emergence of innovatory niches. These were based on the combination of past 
skills and knowledge and the new demands and knowledge of outdoor sports.  Such 
innovatory networks were strongly reliant on the interaction between suppliers and 
their customers in the outdoor trade. This article will show that some new companies 
emerged in the 1970s linked to Lancashire’s past skill base. However, older firms 
including Perseverance Mills founded in 1901 and Baxenden Chemicals, founded in 
1917 also played a part. Perseverance Mills achieved new combinations, through 
applying knowledge accumulated in one sphere of high performance fabrics to new 
uses.In the inter war period, Baxenden Chemicals shifted from saccharin into textile 
coating and finally to polyurethane coatings after the Second World War.9  In a final 
section conclusions will be drawn.  
Lancashire Decline and the Neglected Legacy  
Lancashire’s nineteenth century dominance of the British cotton industry stemmed 
from a combination of pre-industrial skills ( in both yarn and cloth manufacture and 
machine making) with a rising number of specialist merchants and middlemen. In 
addition, a growing taste for adaptable cotton cloths reinforced the expansion of the 
sector during the Industrial Revolution. There were, from the start, strong regional 
variations in the organisation and finance of production, whilst individual 
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communities concentrated on producing distinctive yarns and fabrics using 
technology which evolved synergistically. 10 All of this is well known and widely 
researched as are the forces leading to the emergence of a complex industrial district. 
The life cycle of this industrial district, with Manchester at its heart, has been tracked 
from its appearance during the industrial revolution, through the difficulties of the 
1880s, to relative and absolute decline in the twentieth century. 11 In many respects 
Manchester was the heart of the cotton industrial district, for it was far more than just 
an industrial town. It was the commercial heart of a highly spatially specialised 
industry and was the crucial link with the outside world. Its networks of information 
and commercial intelligence were brought together through the Manchester Royal 
Exchange, which has been described as the ‘power house’ of the cotton industry and 
the ‘nerve centre’ of the industry. 12 The city was also the base for numerous other 
institutions which facilitated information flow. The Manchester region became home 
to an enormous range of fabric types – totalling over 300 before the First World War- 
from engineering, to synthetic dyestuffs, to finishing trades and to a massive 
rubberised rainwear industry.13  
 Rubber is a natural polymer which came to Europe with Christopher 
Columbus in the 15th century and was used from the seventeenth century to proof 
fabric in Mexico. In Britain, the patent records, from the second quarter of the 
seventeenth century, bear witness to numerous attempts to waterproof fabrics, 
including experiments with rubber. 14 However, in 1823 Charles Macintosh, the 
Glasgow chemist, patented a double textured fabric which bore his name. Rubber, 
softened with naptha, was sandwiched between 2 layers of cloth to form a waterproof 
material. His1823 patent claimed: 
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‘A manufacture of 2 or more pieces of linen, woollen, cotton, silk, leather or paper or 
other the like substances …cemented together by means of a flexible cement, the 
nature of which said manufacture is that it is impervious to water and air.’15  
Macintosh used virtually any fabric but became inseparable from the Lancashire 
cotton industry when he sought and gained financial backing from two Manchester 
cotton manufacturers the Birley Brothers and R.W. Barton. Charles Macintosh and 
Co, of Cambridge Mills, Chorlton-on-Medlock began trading in 1824.16
 But there were problems with this rubberised fabric and the original 
Macintosh not only smelled terrible, but it went rigid in the cold, a problem only 
alleviated with the patenting of vulcanisation by Thomas Hancock in 1843 ( in 
parallel with the better known and virtually identical innovation by Charles Goodyear, 
in the United States). Without this development, which made the rubber less sensitive 
to changes in temperature, Macintosh could have made just a fleeting appearance. But 
vulcanisation brought versatility to rubber products, made it possible to make elastic 
and meant that single coated fabrics became an alternative to the old double fabrics. 
Since Macintosh had formed a partnership with Hancock in 1830, his company was in 
a position to benefit from Hancock’s advance and the new and improved Macintosh 
received awards at the Great Exhibition of 1851. Improved Macintosh was actually 
very versatile and was developed for fashionable wear and sporting activity. Indeed 
an exceptionally lightweight garment was designed to fit in a cigar case: 
 ‘Hellewells’s waterproof 5 oz, weight reversible paletot (loose cloak) 
surpasses all others for fine and wet weather. Can be carried in a coat sleeve of a 
packet and folded up in the space of a cigar case. The lightest, the best and the most 
portable protection from rain and dust, adapted for fishing, rowing, yachting, riding, 
driving, hunting, shooting, coursing and deerstalking’. 17
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Clearly Macintosh did not have a monopoly and the success of his new and improved 
rubber goods promoted competition. Before the First World War Manchester and 
Salford supplied two thirds of the waterproof garments made in the UK and 90% of 
the world market was supplied from Britain.18 Rainwear manufacture was from the 
start heavily dependent on chemical processes and knowledge and spawned numerous 
specialist firms involved in textile finishing and coatings. 
 Lancashire’s neglected legacy was not, however, confined to the knowledge 
and skills which went with rubberised rainwear but extended to competing high 
performance fabrics. Macintosh was impermeable and therefore did not ‘breathe’ and 
was very uncomfortable to wear for any energetic activity. The poor breathability of 
Macintosh created a major opportunity for potential competitors looking to design 
more versatile fabrics and clothing. It was a competition made possible by the high 
quality and variety of Lancashire fabrics in this period and which was to lay the 
foundation of one of the counties’ other neglected legacies – its reputation for high 
performance fabrics. 
Thomas Burberry, the Hampshire sports outfitter began to experiment to develop his 
breathable gabardine rainwear in the 1860s and his garments were at first made of 
linen rather than cotton. The trade mark for Burberry was’ ‘Self Ventilating 
Weatherproof ‘and was registered in 1879. As its name suggests, it was a direct 
response to the problems of breathability associated with Macintosh.  
 The competitive success of Burberrys’ at the top end of the market stemmed 
partly from the versatility of the Lancashire cotton industry. Burberrys’ were not cloth 
manufacturers and it was only in 1920, when they went public, that they acquired 
their cloth suppliers Pandora Mills of Farnworth near Bolton and became a fully 
integrated company.19 Prior to that they worked closely with Pandora Mills for fabric 
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development, while the Manchester Chamber of Commerce was involved in testing 
windproof fabrics for Burberry garments.These included the windproofs developed 
for explorers including Shackleton, Scott, Nansen and Amundsen before the First 
World War.  20 However they actively engaged with the industry on fabric 
development and finishing. Following experiments, Burberry was supplied with a 
proofed cotton substitute for linen –gabardine - which, was effectively triple proofed 
– once in the raw material, once in the yarn and once after weaving. The fabric 
required long stapled, high quality Egyptian cotton and high quality weaving. 
Burberry was anything but cheap, however, and it was the impervious nature of 
Macintosh which was the other source of Burberry’s success with wealthy and 
increasingly health conscious customers. 21 For the next 40 years, culminating in a 
volume of over 200 pages entitled Open Spaces, Burberry’s marketing campaign 
hinged upon the ways in which Macintosh damaged health, and Burberry’s benefits. 
Burberrys’ having first discovered an agent that made any woven fabric non-
absorbent, invented machinery to force proof first into the strands of the raw material 
before it is twisted into yarn, secondly into the yarn as prepared for the loom and 
thirdly into the finished cloth.’22
Burberry created their exclusive niche through the use of a combination of 
high quality fabrics, innovative designs and their relentless attack on rubberised 
fabrics. This was made possible by their close relationship with high quality 
Lancashire fabric manufacturers. This, combined with Burberry’s tailoring skills 
enabled them to occupy several top market niches as well as serve the crucial bulk 
military market, before and during the First World War. 23 Their competitive 
strategies changed the market, but did not undermine the production of rubberised 
clothing. This continued to expand so that by the 1890s there were 70 Macintosh 
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companies in Manchester. Instead the exclusivity of Burberry helped to drive 
rubberised rainwear into the mass market, a move which was also facilitated by the 
growing number of Jewish émigré rainwear manufacturers in the Salford and 
Cheetham Hill areas of Manchester. Several of these, including Mandleburgs and 
Frankensteins were also exceptionally innovative and were responsible for a number 
of registered designs, including Mandleburgs’ patented odourless Macintosh.24
Burberry’s reputation for garments made of high performance Lancashire 
cotton cloth continued into the inter war period, when Burberry wind proofs were 
taken to Everest in 1922 and 1924. 25 But inevitably they did not have the market to 
themselves in the 1920s. Competition did not come from their principal rivals in the 
rainwear sector, Acquascutum, but from within Lancashire from Burnley cloth 
manufacturers Haythornthwaites. Invented for the Arctic missionary Sir Wilfred 
Grenfell in 1923, Grenfell cloth was a tightly woven, high quality, cotton gabardine 
that was used for flying suits, high quality leisure wear and, in the 1930s, for tents and 
clothing used in mountaineering. So high was Grenfell’s quality that efforts to pirate it 
in the United States proved futile and American companies were unable to produce it 
in any volume. 26  Inevitably the Second World War created a stimulus for high 
performance fabrics, though not to Grenfell as Haythornthwaite’s Burnley mill was 
closed in 1940 for the duration of the war. Fine cotton nylons were developed for 
parachutes, while Ventile was developed by Dr F.T. Pierce when he was head of the 
Shirley Institute – a research facility of the British Cotton Industry Research 
Association for wartime use: 
‘The first application of the fabric was to protect pilots escorting shipping 
convoys from Great Britain to Russia during the 1939-45 war. A pilot who had to bale 
out in Arctic waters could expect to survive five minutes, but if he could keep dry his 
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heat loss would be much reduced … The cloth is impermeable to sea water under 
these conditions, and the construction of the suit prevents water entering at the wrists, 
neck etc., Even so the airman can, because the cloth is permeable to water vapour, 
wear the suit without discomfort. ‘ 27
.This fabric was introduced in 1941 and dramatically improved survival rates with 
80% of airmen surviving compared with a handful previously. 28
It is clear then that one of the consequences of the development of the 
Lancashire industrial district was a skill, science and mechanical base which allowed 
the development of high quality and technical textiles, alongside the large volume of 
grey cloth. This, combined with the legacy of the rainwear industry can be described 
as part of Lancashire’s hidden or at least forgotten legacy. 
 
The neglected legacy and the UK outdoor trade 1960-1990 
According to Michael Porter: 
 
‘Clusters continually evolve as new companies and industries emerge or 
decline and local institutions develop and change. They can maintain vibrancy 
as competitive locations for centuries; most successful clusters prosper for 
decades at least. However, they can and do lose their competitive edge due 
both to internal and external forces.’ 29
This was precisely what happened in Lancashire. The decline of Lancashire’s 
industrial district began in the inter war period when the cotton industry and 
associated engineering industries stagnated as markets, especially the Indian market, 
collapsed. At its peak, just before the First World War, the Lancashire cotton industry 
employed over 600,000 people in spinning and weaving alone and produced 8050 m 
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yards of cloth, of which 80% was exported. In the 1960s the Lancashire cotton 
industry and its industrial district was in terminal decline. Investment was low, in an 
industry that seemed to stand still in defensive lethargy. By the 1980s cotton cloth 
output stood at 399 m yards while 327m yards of synthetic cloth was produced in 
Lancashire textiles  and employed 76,000 people. The vibrant industrial district of the 
nineteenth century was long gone and the remnants of cotton spinning and weaving 
had been absorbed by the man made fibres industry in a wave of mergers.30  The 
causes of this collapse have been well rehearsed elsewhere and some attention given 
to the experience of Lancashire post cotton. 31 However, little direct attention has 
been given to the legacy of the textile cluster, most especially in textile finishing 
which actually grew in the years after the Second World War, as Table 1 suggests. 
This was because specialist products, even when yarn and cloth were imported, 





































Source : Government Statistical Service, Historical Record of the Census of 
Production 1907-1970 ( London, 1976) .  
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A recent NWDA report concluded that, in 2000, there were 1,010 textile and 
textile product firms located in the North West and 695 apparel companies. In total 
38,100 people were employed in traditional textiles with 24,000 in other textile 
related activities. In a globalised industry, there remained considerable concerns over 
competitiveness with low labour cost producers, especially in retail apparel, but at the 
top end of the market for technical textiles and specialist clothing –the very sector 
which has benefited from Lancashire’s hidden legacy - there was some considerable 
optimism. 
‘Despite depressed domestic and export markets for most of the 1990s and 
continuous downward pressure on prices, the North West interior textile industry has 
remained relatively buoyant and reasonably profitable, especially in comparison with 
other sectors … One of the key assets of the textile and clothing cluster in the North 
West is the range of companies operating in technical textile markets. There are a 
number of internationally recognised companies servicing a range of innovative 
customers in medical, automotive, aerospace, building and industrial markets. …The 
sportswear apparel segment has experienced rapid growth over the past 2 decades 
with … an increased emphasis on the functionality of clothing used to enhance 
performance.’ 34  
Whether the combination of the remnants of Lancashire cotton and the outdoor trade 
truly represent an element of a dynamic industrial cluster, similar to those in the third 
Italy must be open to question.  What this article demonstrates is the extent to which 
knowledge embedded in a previous industrial cluster allowed new combinations of 
past and present expertise to be used in the building of a dynamic industrial niche.  . 35
The textile related products of the outdoor trade include rucksacks, tents, 
sleeping bags, clothing and, from the 1980s footwear.  It is remarkably difficult to 
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estimate the size of the outdoor trade and its market in the 1960s or its consumption of 
textiles. This is because no accurate statistics were collected and its products are not 
separately listed, either in trade statistics or the Census of Production.36 However 
other evidence confirms the UK outdoor trade was tiny until the late 1960s and, with 
the exception of tents and some garments, most high performance clothing and 
equipment was imported. 37  From the mid 1960s turnover and market share of 
leading UK companies such as Karrimor rose significantly. By 1970 Karrimor held 
80% of the UK rucksack a share that never fell below below 50%through to the 
1990s. 38 However, the nature of the outdoor market changed, shifting towards 
clothing in the 1980s. This occurred with the development of fleece and shell clothing 
and the blurring of the distinction between clothing for casual and fashion wear and 
that for outdoor activity.  Today the outdoor trade is not a marginal sector as the total 
market for ‘specialist products sold through specialist outdoor stores’ is valued at 
£670.0m if casual lifestyle clothing and footwear are added, the market valuation 
reaches £1bn. 39 Of the sales of specialist clothing, around 50% was supplied by 
companies based in the UK, or by overseas companies with UK subsidiaries, though 
of course most manufacturing is now offshore. 40
One major legacy of the collapse of the Lancashire textile industry is the lack 
of upstream fibre development in the region with fibre primarily imported and 
dominated by Du Pont. In addition, the major fabric suppliers W.L Gore and 
Sympatex are also based overseas – although the US company  W.L. Gore produces 
Gore-Tex at its Gore UK factory at Livingston in Scotland. Nevertheless, two of the 
outdoor sectors’ vital suppliers Cloverbrook (fleece producers) and Perseverance 
Mills (Pertex) are located in the region. Other strengths identified by the NWDA 
include the number of high profile branded companies in the region, leading edge 
 14
 15
technical knowledge and expertise and a strong ‘cluster in specialist clothing ( high 
value added garments). 41 This recent evidence highlights the significance of 
Lancashire’s largely hidden legacy for the outdoor trade in 2000 and the rest of the 
article sets out to explore how this contributed to the competitive advantage of several 
leading UK outdoor brands.  
Mass participation in outdoor activities such as hill walking and cycling, 
began in the nineteenth century and grew strongly in the inter war period. But this did 
not result in a mass market since incomes were low,, even if the unemployed had 
plenty of time for hill and mountain sports and were extremely active in areas like the 
Peak District in the interwar period. 42. Before the Second World War, the competitive 
advantage of UK outdoor companies lay in tents and in wind proof clothing, anything 
more sophisticated was imported, and this continued to be the case in the immediate 
post war period. However a range of forces, including increasing leisure time, greater 
mobility and changing access laws, made outdoor activities more popular. The first 
ascent of Everest in 1953 made mountaineering more visible and, through its leader 
John Hunt, provided a vital boost to outdoor education in the UK. The outdoor 
education centres became a crucial bulk market for UK outdoor companies in the 
1960s and 1970s. Demand continued to rise in the 1970s and 1980s, bolstered by the 
development of activities like backpacking, Scottish ice climbing and skiing. Media 
coverage of high profile expeditions, such as Annapurna 1970 and Everest South 
West Face, led by Chris Bonington, were crucial too, for the exposure it brought to 
UK suppliers such as Karrimor, Mountain Equipment and Troll. 43  
 The new UK outdoor companies which emerged in this period have been 
described as world beaters and clearly demand forces were crucial to the development 
of these small firms. However, the impact of Lancashire’s neglected legacy of the 
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rainwear and finishing sector was crucial to the emergent competitive advantage of 
companies like Peter Storm, Karrimor and much later Regatta. Other innovations, 
such as the windproof fabric Pertex, lay in the expertise embedded within Padiham 
based Perserverence Mills, a long standing producer of high performance fabrics. This 
was combined with the textile and sporting knowledge of its developer Steve Laycock 
and the close ties he developed with the outdoor trade. 
  There has been increasing attention given to the importance of 
networks as a basis of innovation.  Since economic activity is embedded in society, 
the innovative entrepreneur can build networks which provide external sources of 
information and expertise and allow mutual learning and allow boundaries to be 
crossed. These may begin as highly personal but are likely, through time, to spread to 
include a range of contacts which far exceeds the immediate family and close friends. 
These ‘weaker’ ties allow the individual to reach outside his or her immediate 
contacts to secure a wider range of information. They are often facilitated by such 
economic and social institutions as trade associations, exhibitions and trade shows as 
well as links with tertiary education. 44 In exploring the outdoor trade supply chain it 
will emerge that the social capital of manufacturers was of crucial importance to the 
effectiveness of innovations.  Just as  the nineteenth century industrial cluster 
operated on the basis of face to face interaction, in the second half of the twentieth 
century outdoor trade, regular dialogue between suppliers and manufacturers on one 
side and manufacturers and their customers on the other was a crucial dimension of 
successful product development. 45
 The relationship between the legacy of the Lancashire industrial district and 
competitive advantage in UK outdoor companies, is not a simple linear one or related 
to cotton spinning or weaving per se. Instead it was linked closely to the high level of 
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nineteenth century specialisation and the consequences this had for the shift to nylon 
in outdoor products in the 1960s and 1970s. Although there is strong evidence of path 
dependency, based on Lancashire’s cotton past, the process was often a complicated 
process. The shift from proofing cotton to nylon was not straightforward. Nylon, 
invented by Du Pont scientists in 1934 is not naturally a wet weather fabric. Unlike 
cotton, it does not matter how tightly it is woven, the nature of the fibres prevent it 
from retaining proofing for long. In steady rain, nylon clothing becomes soaked more 
quickly than cotton. To counterbalance this it was necessary to apply impermeable 
coatings to repel water and these were also synthetics – such as neoprene - another 
1930s DuPont invention or polyurethane (PU).46 The skills from Lancashire’s 
rainwear industry, especially those associated with coatings, undoubtedly played an 
important role in building the competitive advantage of companies like Peter Storm 
and Karrimor in the 1960s and 1970s and for Regatta in the 1990s. All these outdoor 
companies relied heavily upon the accumulated expertise of Lancashire suppliers of 
coatings- some old but some new, for the competitive performance of their clothing or 
rucksacks in a changing world.  
One of the men to contribute most to the development of nylon foul weather 
gear in Britain, before 1970, was Noel Bibby, founder of Nottingham based Peter 
Storm in 1954. Noel Bibby was, like so many of the founders of outdoor companies 
an outdoor enthusiast, but one who also understood textiles and clothing, for he 
worked in the garment trade. This background underpinned his business, for he 
understood what could and could not be done with fabrics, the importance of the fit of 
a garment to its performance and also had a good grasp of the capabilities of coatings. 
He applied wartime experiences in the Royal Marines to developing a company which 
specialised in making waterproof and thermal clothing for walking, sailing, golf and 
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country-wear. 47 Until the early 1960s Peter Storm anoraks and ski jackets were 
double texture poplin – closely woven cotton fabric which, like both Ventile and 
Grenfell swelled with water making the weave even tighter and blocking out water. 
But, in 1962 Noel Bibby pioneered Bri –nylon sailing smocks which marked the 
beginning of their 100 lightweight PU coated nylon range and the forerunner of the 
101 Overjacket or cagoule which appeared very shortly afterwards.48 The cagoule had 
originally been developed by French climber Pierre Alain, in the 1930s, using rubber 
coated silk. 49 Peter Storm’s 1960s nylon version, which became such a symbol of UK 
outdoor pursuits, was polyurethane (PU) coated. According to Noel Bibby’s son Paul, 
this range: 
 ‘ really took off when he was able to source 2oz Nylon with a quality 
polyurethane proofing on it making the fabric 100% waterproof and proving a truly 
lasting finish’ 50
Ironically this was not sourced in Lancashire at all but from the Swiss company 
Rotofil. 51 But sourcing a coating for heavier fabrics proved far more difficult and led 
Bibby ultimately to set up his own proofing works, Stormproofing, in Manchester in 
1982, drawing on skilled labour from the finishing trade. But of course PU coatings, 
like Macintosh in the nineteenth century did not breathe, and in sourcing chemicals 
for his proofing processes Bibby came in contact with Baxenden Chemicals Ltd, 
Accrington which had experience of developing textile coatings dating back to the 
interwar period,. In the 1960s they pioneered polyurethane hydrophilic coatings for 
textiles and in the 1970s reached an agreement with the Shirley Institute concerning 
their further development.52 Noel Bibby’s son Paul is clear that the relationship with 




 ‘The success of Gore-Tex grabbed the attention of the whole industry and our 
discussions with Baxenden, regarding their hydrophilic proofing sytem became much 
more important. In the end Stormproofings did most of the production testing of the 
formulations that Baxenden came up with and gave free time to trying out new ideas, 
on the understanding that Peter Storm would be the first to advantage from new 
breathable products. … We were the first into the marine market with a heavy duty 
breathable sailing suit, our country wear range had a breathable and waterproof 
polycotton fabric and we won EMAP product of the year award in 1991 with our 
breathable Microlight range using microfibre nylon. . 53. 
Cotton’s forgotten legacy also lay at the heart of the competitive advantage of 
Karrimor, the Lancashire outdoor company, especially in the rucksack market. 
Karrimor was founded in 1946 by Mary and Charlie Parsons to supply their 
Rawtenstall cycle shop with cycle bags. It began as a small workshop above the shop 
and when Mike Parsons joined the company in 1960 he was the 7th employee and 
turnover was 2/3 of the retail store. In building the business, Parsons gained a deep 
understanding of the manufacturing process and, based within old textile Lancashire 
of the capabilities of textiles and their associated processes. As an active sportsman he 
had a working knowledge and regular dialogue with mountaineers and those involved 
in outdoor pursuits. This bridge between technical knowledge and sporting needs 
played a crucial role in Karrimor’s growing dominance of the rucksack market. By 
1975 the company employed 163 workers and controlled 80% of the UK rucksack 
market, exporting 40% of its turnover. In the 1960s Karrimor’s principle competitors 
had been Continental companies such as Norwegian Bergans, the French rucksack 
company Lafuma and Brown Best from Britain.  In this period, packs had been made 
of cotton duck. Initially Karrimor’s competitive advantage came from combining 
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innovative design with relatively low prices. However, in the 1970s the competitive 
climate of the UK rucksack market was changed fundamentally by the establishment 
of Berghaus by Peter Lockey and Gordon Davison in 1972 in Newcastle. The battle 
for the UK rucksack market was intense and very personal, based heavily upon design 
and reliability combined with production and delivery performance and marketing 
abilities. 54 However a crucial advantage for Karrimor (lacked by Lockey and 
Davison) were deep contacts developed by Mike Parsons and his product manager 
Eddie Creig with the Lancashire textile industry and especially with coating 
companies over a 20 year period. As Eddie Creig explained : 
 ‘The basic point on any development [is] co-operation and experience. A 
sharing of knowledge. Although this is concerned with the development of fabrics the 
same careful co-operation exists between myself and our suppliers of zips, mouldings, 
met fasteners, foams etc’ 55
During the late 1960s Parsons began to shift rucksack production into nylon and 
encountered difficulties with the PU coating which regularly peeled off. This resulted 
in discussions with their supplier, Gordon and Fairclough of Darwen. This small 
company was founded in 1971 and had worked closely with Courtaulds before 
moving into PU coatings. The discussions were robust and ultimately creative as 
Karrimor product manager, Eddie Creig, recalled: 
 ‘ “How can you expect to have the correct material if you don’t speak to the 
people who know what coated fabric is” ? They asked. The resultant meetings always 
seemed to me the main reason why we have lead the field in our section of the leisure 
industry… In subsequent years I got to know the dyer that our coaters were using at 
that time. It was most important that the fabric was properly dyed and only by close 
contact between dyer and manufacturer (maker up) could he have a real understanding 
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of what was required and why…’56
The result of this co-operation in 1979 was the introduction of KS-100e described as ‘ 
a completely new rucksack fabric with a new elastomer coating.. The first fabric 
purpose designed for rucsacks’ – in contrast to Cordura, the coated fabric favoured by 
Berghaus.57 Confidence in the quality and performance of this fabric was such that 
Karrimor were able to launch lifetime guarantees on rucksacks made of the fabric. It 
was a radical move and a ‘first’ for the industry and crucial for Karrimor’s 
competitive advantage. It was also controversial, however and some retailers viewed 
it merely as a marketing ploy. 58 Reliable figures have not survived which would 
allow quantitative testing of the impact of KS100e and the lifetime guarantee on 
Karrimors’ performance and export figures were distorted in the early 1980s by an 
overvalued pound. In any event isolating a single dimension of competitive advantage 
of a company can be dangerous and misleading. Certainly Parsons himself is clear 
that this combination was a crucial move for his company and to the continued 
popularity of his products. In addition, Peter Lockey confirmed that the lifetime 
guarantee was indeed a radical step for Karrimor, which maintained its domination of 
the rucksack market into the 1990s.59  In addition the company continued to export 
over 30% of tunrnover during the 1970s and 1980s which suggests its products were 
internationally competitive.. 
Figure 1 Karrimor Exports as a % of turnover  
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In the context of this article the development of KS-100e and the related lifetime 
guarantee, demonstrate the role of Lancashire’s hidden legacy in the finishing trades 
for a leading British outdoor company. The consistent and open dialogue between 
Parsons and Creig and Gordon and Fairclough created a level of understanding which 
allowed the fruits of this legacy to be applied to the development of consumer goods. 
It was a genuine innovation dialogue, which benefited both parties. 60  
 Currently Britain’s largest outdoor brand is Regatta with sales totalling 
£46.2m in 2001-2. 61 The company was a relative late comer to the outdoor trade, yet 
one where Lancashire’s legacy of the rainwear sector, firmly underpinned by 
sustained dialogue, was a crucial advantage. This new outdoor player appeared  in 
1990. Risol –to be renamed Regatta in 1996- was a sales led company which set out 
to capture the general as opposed to the specialised outdoor market.62 Their owners 
saw an enormous potential market for cheap breathable waterproofs for the general 
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walker – from the casual country walker to urban dog walkers. They were right as 
there was an estimated 10m occasional walkers in the UK in 1995. 63 Good breathable 
waterproofs in the 1990s were expensive and arguably the vast majority of walkers 
did not venture onto the hills and were probably over-equipped. Of course some 
jackets, like the Berghaus Trango, were bought as much as fashion and status symbols 
as for the hills. The Blacks, who owned Risol, had been Lancashire rainwear 
manufacturers from the 1930s and, like Noel Bibby, used their knowledge of coatings 
and garments to build a mass market brand. Keith Black, the current MD of Regatta, 
drew a clear line between his family’s textile clothing background and the sports and 
mountaineering enthusiasm of many in the outdoor trade. It was this background and 
the use of offshore manufacturing which he believed allowed Regatta to break the 
mould by producing the first mass market, affordable, breathable clothing using the 
Isotex coating 64. According to Black, Regatta did this  
 ‘by working with textile mills and through close personal relationships 
within the Lancashire area… you know, in fact two of my best friends are fabric 
importers and he brought in the fabric, and another of my very close friends has a 
coating plant and … the technology became available… We used to buy the fabric out 
in Asia, bring it into this country, coat it here, then send the garments back to be 
manufactured and then brought it back here and the price was amazing, it just hugely 
opened up the market place, because until then all the breathability was basically 
Gore-Tex or Sympatex. We have quite a fascination with fabrics and are constantly 
looking for the next fabric.’ 65
Turnover grew consistently during the 1990s as Figure 2 suggests and profits 
averaged £25m per annum 1990-2000.66  
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 The networks based upon Lancashire’s neglected legacy provide some 
important insights into the innovation process in the predominantly small and medium 
sized companies which dominated the UK outdoor trade. Typically companies such as 
Karrimor, Peter Storm and later Regatta did not have large internal R and D 
departments and nor did they directly employ scientists to conduct sophisticated 
chemical research.  Knowledge of the functional demands of their products led them 
to seek collaborative arrangements with other companies. In turning to Baxenden 
Chemicals, when he was looking to develop breathable garments,, Noel Bibby was 
drawing on decades of knowledge of coatings from scientists in Baxenden’s Applied 
Chemicals Division. Moreover, by this time Baxenden was part of the US based 
Witco Chemical Group which significantly increased its research capacity. 67 
However, successful collaboration is based upon mutual gain and, by collaborating 
with Peter Storm, Baxenden gained a partner keen to undertake the crucial product 
testing that turns an invention into an innovation.  Gordon and Fairclough Ltd , was a 
a very different kind of company from Baxenden. Unlike Baxenden, with its large R 
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and D capabilities, Gordon and Fairclough were themselves an SME which worked 
under contract developing technical coatings  on behalf textile users like Karrimor. 
Chemical knowledge was needed for this kind of work but this was provided by their 
sales director, Rod Chambers, himself a chemist, rather from the work of large 
laboratories. 68 Family owned Regatta was far larger than firms like Karrimor, but it is 
also clear that the Blacks relied on the supply chain for textile innovation rather than 
on in house activity.  
 
So far discussion has centred upon the impact of the Lancashire coatings 
industry on the outdoor trade. It has shown the way in which Lancashire’s skill base, 
derived from rainwear and associated chemicals and finishing industries, often 
stimulated the establishment of new companies and new developments which 
underpinned the competitive advantage of outdoor products. Much of the initiative in 
fabric development has shifted to the United States and Japan since 1970 and 
Lancashire textile manufacture has collapsed. In the changing world of the twentieth 
century the only markets in which textile producers in a developed economy could 
hope to maintain competitive advantage were those demanding high performance, 
high value added products. It has been shown that Lancashire had enjoyed 
considerable competitive prowess in high performance textiles for outdoor sports 
before the Second World War. A range of factors including war-time utility schemes, 
inexperience in Continental European markets, supply side weaknesses, structural 
changes and government policy, made it hard for firms at the lower end of the market 
to shift in ways which might have stemmed Lancashire’s decline. 69 However, for 
some specialist firms, a deep and lengthy knowledge of high performance fabrics 
brought with it a crucial legacy from Lancashire’s past, which has impacted on 
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product development in the outdoor trade.  
 Neither Burberry nor Grenfell remained significant players in the outdoor 
sport market after the Second World War, although Ventile remains a high 
performance outdoor fabric –especially for polar exploration. 70 One company where 
expertise and knowledge of high performance fabrics has evolved from the early 
twentieth century to have a major impact on product development for the outdoor 
trade world wide is Perseverance Mills Ltd of Padiham in Lancashire. Founded in 
1901, the company manufactures Pertex., the almost micro-fabric which has 
revolutionised the development of breathable wind proof shells, and covers for 
sleeping bags and the design of down clothing. Pertex is used for a range of other 
products, including parachutes and clothing for extreme sports. 71  
 Perseverance Mills was founded in 1901 by Herbert Noble and produced grey 
cloth for the Indian market up to 1914. Its move into high performance fabrics came 
during the First World War with a shift into balloon fabric for barrage balloons to 
guard against anticipated German air raids. The shift into industrial and technical 
fabrics continued post war and the firm also moved into typewriter ribbon 
manufacture and into synthetics in the interwar period. By 1925 their product mix was 
listed in Skinners’ Cotton Trade Directory as follows: 
 ‘ Aeroplane cloths, artificial silk, artificial silk fancies, austrias, balloon cloths, 
brilliantes, cambrics, cellulars, doria stripes, fancy figured cloths, hair cords, 
jacconettes, (fine) lawns, limbricks, linings shot), lustres, mercerised cotton, fancies, 
mock lino, fine muslins, pongees, poplin stripes, poplins, pyjama cloths, shadow 
stripes, shirtings, typewriter cloth, umbrella cloths, voiles, warp satins’72  
Their position in the specialist textile sector was further reinforced in the Second 
World War when the company became a major Air Ministry and Admiralty supplier . 
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This continued post war with accounts for balloons, air, dinghies and life rafts for Air 
and Sea rescue. Typewriter and then computer ribbon – products they continue to 
produce – became increasingly important. 73 In the late 1970s Pertex, production 
manager Steve Laycock began applying computer ribbon technology to fabrics for the 
outdoor trade and Pertex was the result. This was a genuine example of new 
combinations resulting from applying technology understood in one sector to the 
products of another. It was also an example of shop floor knowledge in a relatively 
small company, as opposed to laboratory innovation, in the first instance.  To improve 
the light, windproof and breathable fabric, he worked in close contact with his 
outdoor customers, first Hamish Hamilton and later Rab Carrington. 
 Pertex’s ability to move moisture out of the fabric made it ideal for Hamish 
Hamilton’s needs and he was their first outdoor customer. He used a combination of 
pile which also shed water and Pertex for his Gemini sleeping bags launched at 
Harrogate in 1985 with a clothing range based on the same principle the following 
year.74 Dave Brook of the Leeds University Textile Testing Unit – who did the original 
tests on the sleeping bags- was impressed by the idea though pointed out that since pile 
was quite heavy, they never caught on in the market place. 75
Hamilton’s outdoor company Buffalo was on the same Sheffield industrial estate as 
Rab Carrington, and Hamish put him in contact with Laycock and Perseverance. This 
was the beginning of a highly successful and innovative relationship which parallels 
the ties companies like Karrimor and Peter Storm had with their suppliers. Laycock 
really listened and a genuine dialogue developed which benefited both companies and 
crucially genuinely improved products. Superficial changes to fabrics that created 
cosmetic changes to products had no attraction for Rab because he was looking for 
were genuine improvements . Rab became the first commercial down sleeping bag 
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company to use Pertex On the strength of this Carrington and Steve Laycock of 
Perseverance developed highly functional, versatile fabrics to meet specific needs in 
the outdoor trade. For Carrington Rab recalled a particularly fruitful trip to a trade 
show in Chamonix :  
‘ We drove out and we were talking fabrics and I said , ‘Oh, you know, what we need 
for a fabric… that would actively move moisture from the skin, out to the outside, 
rather than just dispersing it, and you know, Steve said, ‘ Well I think there is a way 
of doing that’, and this was…before 1990, I’m sure, and he produced a fabric which 
lay dormant for about ten years, and it’s now one of the exciting fabrics that 
Perseverance has got, - their Equilibrium fabric, and we had been discussing this, you 
know and you know, sometimes the time’s not quite right for things, and you’ve got 
to just wait and see what happens, and bide your time’76  
Conclusions 
This article has demonstrated the complexity of the legacy of cotton Lancashire and 
has explored the changing face of the county’s industry, even after the massive 
collapse of the UK’s largest nineteenth century export industry. It has shifted attention 
away from the much debated cotton manufacturing sector towards those parts of the 
industry which were more highly knowledge intensive and science based on the one 
hand, and linked to high value added sectors on the other. The knowledge and skill 
base associated with the Manchester rainwear industry proved crucial to the emerging 
competitive advantage of the UK outdoor trade from the 1960s. The article has shown 
that both old and new companies developed close synergistic relationships with 
emerging outdoor companies allowing the development of new combinations. 
Similarly analysis of the experience of the high performance fabric sector has been 
seriously neglected, not least because the options for moving up market were 
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eschewed by the majority of companies. Yet the article has demonstrated the way in 
which Perseverance Mills developed an innovative fabric which was to transform the 
performance of outdoor clothing in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The collapse of spinning and weaving of cotton and of fibre production is significant, 
for both its scale and the impact on future innovative capacity at the top end of the 
market. However, the concentration of academic research on the production of yarn 
and cloth rather than on the consumer products produced has inevitably distorted the 
way in which the Lancashire legacy has been interpreted. Since innovation is about 
new combinations, fostered often through dynamic cluster evolution, this analysis 
allows greater understanding of the way new products evolved, through sustained 
dialogue across sectoral boundaries. From 1960 to the 1990s, there evolved a set of 
supply chain relationships which were crucial to the competitive advantage of the UK 
outdoor trade and where the relationship between textile related specialisms and 
outdoor companies was undoubtedly synergistic. The article demonstrates that far 
from being the monopoly of R and D departments in large companies innovation was 
based firmly in the supply chain of the outdoor trade and relied strongly on 
networking activity.  
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